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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
The obvious objection to having the statute of limitations run
from the time of discovery is that it might subject professionals to
increased liability. Conceivably, limiting the period of liability from the
discovery of the wrong could extend liability forever. This problem of
unlimited professional liability was also left unresolved in Broome since
no mention was made of any time limit to the "continuous treatment."
Thus, if a professional were engaged in reparative work, the limitation
period would be tolled indefinitely until the termination of that treat-
ment. It is suggested that a more equitable approach would be to
establish some absolute time limit after commission of the wrong
beyond which liability would cease. However the New York courts or
Legislature ultimately resolves this issue, fairness to the public should
be balanced with concern for reasonable professional liability.
ARTIcLE 3- JURISDICnON AND SERViCE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 311(1): Jurisdiction expanded.
Personal service upon a domestic or foreign corporation within
New York is obtained under CPLR 311(1). This provision requires
that delivery of a summons be made to an officer, director, agent,
cashier, or "to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service." 29
An examination of this section was recently made in Board of
Education v. Half Hollow Hills Teachers Association,"° wherein the
Supreme Court, Suffolk County, in a special proceeding to set aside an
arbitration award, was faced with determining the validity of service
of process upon defendant's attorney.31 The Association's attorney had
been designated a qualified agent to receive process pursuant to Rule
36 of the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association (Rule 36).32 Even though defendant impliedly con-
2D CPLR 311(1).
S0 79 Misc. 2d 223, 358 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1974).
31 This special proceeding was brought by the Board of Education pursuant to CPLR
7511(b). The Board argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his power in determining that
the Board had violated its agreement with the Teachers Association and requested that
the court vacate the arbitration award by which the parties were otherwise bound.
32 Am. Am. Ass'N VOL. LAB. R. 36 (1974). Rule 36 provides:
Each party to a Submission or other agreement which provides for arbitration
under these Rules shall be deemed to have consented and shall consent that any
papers, notices, or process necessary or proper for the initiation or continuation
of an arbitration under these Rules and for any court action in connection
therewith or the entry of judgment on an award made thereunder, may be
served upon such party (a) by mail addressed to such party or his attorney at
his last known address, or (b) by personal service, within or without the state
wherein the arbitration is to be held.
Id. (emphasis added).
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sented to be bound by Rule 36, it moved to dismiss the proceeding
upon the ground that the court had not acquired in personam juris-
diction because service upon its attorney failed to comply with the
procedure outlined in CPLR 311(1). Defendant contended that its at-
torney was not a valid agent to receive process within the meaning of
the statute as he had not been authorized "by appointment or by law
to receive service."88 The court rejected this contention, asserting that
defendant had consented to the authorization of its attorney as agent
pursuant to the arbitration agreement it entered into with the plaintiff
Board of Education.8 4
As the court pointed out, various methods are available for the
authorization by "appointment or by law" of an agent to receive
process on behalf of a corporation. Section 5-1502H(6) of the General
Obligations Law (GOL), for example, recognizes the creation of a valid
agent" upon the use of the general power of attorney statutory form.88
In addition, both CPLR 318 and section 305 of the Business Corpo-
ration Law (BCL) establish a procedure whereby a corporation may
"appoint" an authorized agent to accept service of process.87 Finally,
under section 304 of the BCL, the Secretary of State is authorized by
"law" as an agent to accept process for all domestic and foreign cor-
porations doing business in New York.88
Nevertheless, the Half Hollow Hills court was unable to find
statutory authority expressly validating the appointment of an agent
pursuant to the arbitration provision relied upon by plaintiff. Having
8379 Misc. 2d at 225, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 288, quoting CPLR 311(l).
84 Id. at 227, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289. Although the Board was able to defeat the juris-
dictional defense presented by defendant, its petition to vacate the arbitration award was
denied. The court determined that the arbitration award requiring the Board to reinstate
three recently dismissed music chairmen was valid because defendant's employment
contract had provided for the positions. Plaintiff's dismissal of the chairmen, therefore,
was deemed a breach of such agreement. Id. at 228, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
In addition, the court noted that its review of the arbitration award did not include
questions of fact, thus adhering to the general principle that an arbitration award is
deemed to be conclusive on its merits. Id. at 229, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 291, citing Colony Liquor
Dists., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 669, 34 App. Div. 2d 1060, 312 N.Y.S.2d 408 (3d Dep't
1970), afl'd, 28 N.Y.2d 596, 268 N.E.2d 645, 319 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1971) and Colletti v. Mesh,
28 App. Div. 2d 245, 260 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 460, 213 N.E.2d 894,
266 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1965).
85 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1502H(6) (McKinney 1964).
86Id. § 5-1501 (McKinney Supp. 1974). See Torre v. Grasso, 11 Misc. 2d 275, 173
N.Y.S.2d 828 (Schenectady County Ct. 1958) (service upon an attorney pursuant to prede-
cessor of § 5-1502H held valid).
87CPLR 318 requires the agent to file his appointment with the office of the county
clerk in such county as the corporation resides or has its principal office. Id. Section 305
of the BCL requires that the agent be registered with the Department of State. N.Y. Bus.
CoRe. LAw § 305 (McKinney 1963).
88 N.Y. Bus. Coae. LAW § 304 (McKinney 1963). See Pohlers v. Exeter Mfg. Co., 293
N.Y. 274, 56 N.E.2d 582 (1944) (prior to enactment of § 804, Court's jurisdiction upheld
based upon party's authorization of Secretary of State as agent to receive process).
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examined GPLR 318 and section 305 of the BCL, the court determined
that "neither of these sections contemplate [sic] the appointment of
an attorney to receive process under Rule 36."39 Section 5-1502H(6) of
the GOL was also held inapplicable because defendant had not used
the statutory short form specified therein.40
The court, referring to service of process upon an agent designated
under a contractual agreement, noted the increasing ease with which
jurisdiction may validly be obtained.41 In support of this method of
conferring jurisdiction the court cited National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent42 in which the United States Supreme Court, inter-
preting the applicable federal rule, held that the contractual designa-
tion of an agent to receive process created a proper agent who was
"authorized by appointment."43 Similarly, the Half Hollow Hills court
upheld service upon defendant's agent, appearing to rest its decision
more upon the public policy which favors a liberal approach to inter-
pretation of the requirements for obtaining jurisdiction than upon any
designation made pursuant to Rule 36.44
39 79 Misc. 2d at 226, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289. Both CPLR 318 and § 305 of the BCL
establish a specific procedure for the creation of an agency relationship. See note 37 supra.
40 Id. at 227, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
4179 Misc. 2d at 227, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289. A number of cases have sustained service
upon a contractually designated agent present in New York to accept service of process
on behalf of a foreign corporation or nondomiciliary. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Graphic Art Designers Inc., 36 Misc. 2d 442, 234 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1962); Phillips v. Garramone, 36 Misc. 2d 1041, 233 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1962); Emerson Radio 9- Phonograph Corp. v. Eskind, 32 Misc. 2d 1038, 228
N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1957). See also H. PrmTRmuaN & J. McLAuGHmLn,
NEw York PRatce 314-15 (3d ed. 1973). The repeated rationale which has enabled the
above courts to acquire jurisdiction over the foreign corporation or nondomiciliary has
been the party's consent to have process served upon such agent. Likewise, the supreme
court in Half Hollow Hills recognized that given a contractual agreement evidencing the
intent to designate an agent to receive process, there is no apparent reason to disregard
such designation, provided due process requirements are satisfied. Notably, due process
was not an issue in Half Hollow Hills because defendant impliedly conceded that it had
received prompt notice of the special proceeding. 79 Misc. 2d at 227, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
42375 U.S. 311 (1964). In Szukhent, defendant, a Michigan farmer, rented farm equip-
ment from a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in New York.
The lease agreement designated a New York resident as defendant's agent for purposes
of receiving process. The agent was served with process in New York and on the same day
mailed the summons and complaint to defendant. In upholding the right of parties to
contractually agree to the appointment of an agent to receive service of process, the
Court held that service upon such designated agent was valid even where the agent did
not explicitly promise to give notice of suit to the principal, provided notice in fact was
given. Id. at 316. See generally 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 70 (1964).
43 375 U.S. at 318. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court was concerned with Rule
4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Szukhent holding is persuasive au-
thority in interpreting CPLR 311(1) since both provisions permit service upon an "agent
authorized by appointment or by law." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1); CPLR 311(1).
4479 Misc. 2d at 227, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289. The court stated that there was "an ex-
panding concept permitting parties to agree to service upon a third person." Id. Indeed,
too literal an approach to jurisdictional requirements often appears impractical and
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The court seems to have encountered unnecessary difficulty in
reaching its determination. Previously, in National Equipment Rental
Ltd. v. Dec-Wood Corp.,45 the Appellate Term, Second Department,
ruled that service of process in conformance with a contractual arrange-
ment validly conferred jurisdiction upon the court.46 That ruling has
been interpreted as permitting service according to any procedure to
which the parties have agreed.47 Given such a construction it appears
that the only question which required resolution by the Half Hollow
Hills court was whether the Association's implied consent to be bound
by Rule 36 qualified as a contractual appointment.48 An affirmative
determination of this issue under the consent jurisdiction precedent
established by Dec-Wood would have clearly established the Associa-
tion's attorney as an "agent authorized by appointment" under CPLR
311(1). The result would have been an opinion consistent with prece-
dent and in accord with the current trend towards expansion of a
court's ability to obtain jurisdiction.
unduly harsh on the litigants. In Isaf v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299
N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969), for example, service upon a clerk substituting for an absent
freight agent was held invalid. The Half Hollow Hills court quoted with approval Dean
McLaughlin's comment that service upon the clerk in Isaf "could be sustained upon the
theory that his duties had acquainted him with what he should do if served with a
summons," especially in light of the fact that the clerk had immediately delivered the
summons to the general counsel. 79 Misc. 2d at 227, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 289, quoting 7B
McKINNEY's CPLR 311, commentary at 256 (1972).
45 51 Misc. 2d 999, 274 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1966).
46 Id. In Dec-Wood defendant, by prior written consent, had agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the New York courts pursuant to service of process upon it by certified
mail, return receipt requested. Such service was deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Although this decision was determinative of the ability to obtain jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation by contractual consent, the rule appears equally applicable to Half
Hollow Hills. In short, consent to jurisdiction is permissible and proper. See note 41 and
accompanying text supra.
4 7 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 301, commentary at 16 (1972).
48 In a comparable case, Bauer v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 31 App. Div.
2d 239, 296 N.YS.2d 675 (4th Dep't 1969), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
held that plaintiff's consent to have his attorney receive process pursuant to the rules
of the American Arbitration Association had created an authorized agent. Id. at 243, 296
N.Y.S.2d at 679. Bauer involved the validity of service upon petitioner's attorney for the
commencement of a special proceeding to stay arbitration. Petitioner had, in fact, pre-
viously consented to an arbitration rule similar to that in Half Hollow Hills allowing
service to be made upon his attorney. Finding the defendant's attorney a contractually ap-
pointed agent, the Bauer court held that service upon such agent was a valid predicate
for the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
In addition, the court noted that failure of the parties to utilize the procedure for
the designation of an agent for service set forth in CPLR 318 did not invalidate the
service. CPLR 318, the court explained, provides a permissible, rather than an exclusive,
method for designation of an agent to receive process. Id., citing National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). See generally Torre v. Grasso, 11 Misc. 2d 275, 173
N.Y.S.2d 828 (Schenectady County Ct. 1958) (CPA 227, predecessor of CPLR 318, held
merely a permissive method for designating an agent to receive process); 7B McKiNNEY'S
CPLR 318, commentary at 358 (1972); H. PETERFEEUND & J. McLAUGHLIN, NEw YoaK PRAc-
TIcE 315 n.1 (3d ed. 1973); 1 WK&M 318.05.
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